In a report of recent congressional testimony, GAO provides statistics that provide insight. The report is available from the GAO Web Site.
How does this compare with your experience? Does your response plan address this range of cybersecurity incidents? At Coordinated Response we use this type of information to inform our response plan development and response plan reviews.
A report of the testimony is available from the GAO Web Site. For some interesting statistics from this report refer to GAO Statistics on Cyber Security.
With this information the response team makes informed decisions on what resources to apply and what actions to take. Refer to our Response Management Framework for added insight.
Let us help you with a response plan review that considers your information security risk assessment.
Tucker Baily and Josh Brandley, both with McKinsey, published an article on the HBR blog network identifying the 10 steps towards an effective incident response plan. Their article highlights some of the experiences that led to their conclusion. It’s worth a quick read.
Here I paraphrase their list to emphasize the key points and I relate these points to our response management framework.
This is a good list of 10 key success factors for an effective incident response program. It serves as a good checklist against our Response Management Framework. Let us help you with a response plan review that considers your information security risk assessment.
Bailey, Tucker and Brandley, Josh, “Ten Steps to Planning an Effective Cyber-Incident Response”, Harvard Business Review Blog Network, July 1, 2013. Retrieved 03/07/2014 from: http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/07/ten-steps-to-planning-an-effect/.
The Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Web Site. Next week the final version is due. The preliminary paper identifies 5 core functions. The Response Management Framework compliments the NIST framework and extends three of the core functions.
Some experts have been critical of the framework, but others support it. See Taylor Amerding’s article “NIST’s finalized cybersecurity framework receives mixed reviews”, January 31, 2014, in CSO Online.
Of course, Detect, Respond, and Recover are the context for your incident response plan.
The Response Management Framework provides the details of who, what, when, where, and how.
Of course, Coordinated Response uses the information provided from the Identify function to help build the Impact Assessment and to properly Prioritize the Incident.
This makes a good list of New Year’s resolutions for improving an incident response plan and program.
Many readers may recognize this description. This description paraphrases the description of the Incident Response Plan security control (IR-8) in the NIST Publication SP 800-53. For more information on SP 800-53 refer to What Does NIST Say about Incident Response?, March 2013.
Let us help you with a response plan review that moves forward on these valuable measures.
This is the second note on Insider Threats reflecting the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition, CMU/SEI-2012-TR-012, December 2012. The first note, Insider Threat and Incident Response, summarized key elements of the guide related to incident response planning and management. This note applies those elements to the incident response planning process.
The guide identifies the following items and practices of special importance to incident response when dealing with an insider threat:
According to the 2012 Cybersecurity Watch Survey a company has a 50% chance of experiencing an insider incident in any given year or a certainty of experiencing an incident in a 2 year time frame (see Insider Threat and Incident Response for specific references). Our note, A Data Breach and Insider Threats, examines the cost of a data breach and the potential roles played by insiders.
In our Response Management Framework we describe this as the Core and Extended Response Team.
An insider incident is likely to involve legal, human resources, and physical security. More importantly, the actions require special authorizations and notifications as the response proceeds. Using an agile approach – iterating through incident actions with the extended team members – provides a useful delineation of the appropriate actions.
Documented policies that are consistently enforced support defensible actions including employee or contractor termination. Documentation and consistent enforcement are even more important when stronger legal remedies apply. The incident response plan with its associated actions is a key element for documenting policies and for insuring consistent actions.
The Common Sense Guide recommends developing a comprehensive, enterprise-wide checklist to use at the time of separation. The checklist might identify: (1) a list of employees who need to know of the termination; (2) a list of accounts assigned to the employee; and (3) a list of resources to monitor after the termination.
The last point recognizes that terminating an employee may result in escalating the threat presented by the employee. Monitoring key resource post-termination may identify an incident before a serious impact occurs. The checklist can be used to help identify likely insider incidents.
It is important to note that when any insider incident occurs, the incident response may collect important documentation needed to support the termination process.
The guide recommends maintaining an up-to-date inventory of (1) all data types being processed; (2) all devices including network devices, mobile devices, and credentialing tools; and (3) your information geography: sensitive areas; single or multiple locations; domestic or foreign locations; and physical or virtual (cloud-based) locations.
These inventories are important tools needed for all effective incident response, not just insider incidents. Understanding your assets is a critical element of the next practice: an enterprise-wide risk assessment.
The guide recommends a number of controls that mitigate the risk of an insider threat, for example, background checks. But, the enterprise-wide risk assessment does more. It considers the risk insider threats pose against assets beyond information resources. It provides potential impact assessments associated with various assets. This information is important to building and effective incident response program.
In an earlier note, Risk Assessment and Incident Response, we talk about this important linkage.
A coordinated response is a bigger challenge when an incident involves an insider. Establishing en effective plan is an important step and the Common Sense Guide provides elements and practices to hone the perfect plan.
Let us help you with a response plan review that considers your exposure to insider threats.
ENISA – the EU Network and Information Security Agency – examined cybersecurity incidents associated with Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The findings were published in a white paper: Can We Learn from Industrial Control System Security Incidents?, ENISA web site, October 2013. The link references a press release that provides the background and a summary of the paper, as well as access to the white paper itself.
ENISA’s key findings apply to many high-value information systems:
All of these practices should be addressed in your incident response plan if you are dealing with a high-value system.
Let us help you with a response plan review that (1) includes physical security as an extension of your incident response team; (2) addresses evidence collection and control; (3) identifies ex post analysis expertise for more effective incident review; and (4) recognizes inter-organizational communications requirements and opportunities.
The Verizon 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report provides insight into the role of insiders when data is breached.
Attackers targeted mostly finance, retail, and food service industries. Attackers profit from selling payment data or personal information. Almost all states and the District of Columbia have data breach laws governing this type of incident.
Here the attackers were seeking intellectual property – trade secrets, sensitive internal data, or systems information. The targeted industries were Manufacturing, Professional Services and Transportation. This raises issues of liability or economic loss.
There are two important statistics associated with cyber-espionage campaigns.
But, Verizon also states that External Actors are involved in over 90% of all data breaches. So, often an external actor recruits or coerces an insider.
Include insider threats and the potential impact of a data breach in your risk assessment.
When dealing with insider threats, consider the legal and human resource issues. Managing employees or contractors involves legal and regulatory issues. When dealing with a data breach, appropriate legal steps need to be followed.
Coordinated Response can help you develop a plan that anticipates the unique actions needed to address a data breach or an insider threat.
ISACA – The Information Systems Audit and Control Association – is a good resource for Incident Response Teams.
The ISACA Web Site offers a white paper: Incident Management and Response. This is a link to the base page with access to the white paper as well as a good set of additional resources for Incident Planning and Response.
The paper makes key points that help strengthen a response plan including:
Risk planning and response planning are linked. The risks and resulting impacts occur in the following areas:
This is an idea that Coordinated Response embraces in The Risk Management Framework specifically in the area of Impact Assessment and Incident Prioritization.
A robust incident response program reduces the risk of response – the probability of the response itself contributing inadvertently to risk exposure. The paper stresses the characteristics of an effective program:
For each impact area, it is important to provide metrics or descriptions that differentiate the impact level. Low, medium, and high are not enough as impact measures. Without metrics different people assign different meanings to the terms low, medium, and high.
It’s worth stressing that the impact component of the risk assessment can and should be used during the Incident Impact Assessment. The Response Team measures adverse impact to determine the needed response.
With this information the response team makes informed decisions on what resources to apply and what actions to take. Refer to our Response Management Framework for added insight.
Let us help you with a response plan review that considers your information security risk assessment.
In December 2012, The CERT/CC Insider Threat Center published the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition, CMU/SEI-2012-TR-012. The guide uses extensive research to examine the nature of insider threats and their probability. It is an excellent resource.
This is the first in a series of notes on insider threats – the first note examines the guide and the next considers the impact on incident response planning and handling.
“Insider threats are influenced by a combination of technical, behavioral, and organizational issues” (from the Executive Summary). As a result, management,human resources (HR), legal counsel, and physical security may be involved in the response along with the Information Technology (IT) and Information Assurance (IA) departments.
Of course, this aligns with the Core and Extended Response Team in the Response Management Framework.
The range includes:
Each of these may require specialized incident actions as part of the response.
The CyberSecurity Watch Survey provides the following statistics:
This annual survey is sponsored by U.S. Secret Service, CERT Insider Threat Center, Deloitte, and CSO Magazine.
The following chart suggests that all organizations – large and small – have close to a 50/50 chance of experiencing an insider incident in any given year. Or every 2 years give or take a month an insider incident will occur. NOTE: there were 479 respondents, 1/3 were organizations with 5,000 employees or more, 2/5 were organizations with less than 500. This suggests a representative survey.
The 2012 Survey was retrieved from a Google search for “2012 CyberSecurity Watch”. |
The guide recommends 19 practices for mitigating Insider Threats (See the table at the end of this article). Many of these are well known security controls, but they are presented through the lens of the insider threat. For each practice, the guide (1) defines the protective measure; (2) identifies challenges; (3) provides case studies; (4) identifies quick wins applicable to all organizations; (5) identifies additional quick wins for large organizations; and (6) maps the recommend practices to NIST, CERT, and ISO standards.
We can work with you to incorporate or improve how your response plan addresses insider incidents.
Emphasized practices have a direct bearing on incident response planning and management.
1 | Include insider threats in an enterprise-wide risk assessment. | 11 | Institutionalize system change controls. |
2 | Clearly document and consistently enforce policies and controls. | 12 | Log, monitor, and audit insider actions with log correlation or SIEM system. |
3 | Incorporate insider threat security training for all employees. | 13 | Monitor and control remote access including mobile devices. |
4 | Beginning with the hiring process, monitor suspicious or disruptive behavior. | 14 | Develop a comprehensive employee termination procedure. |
5 | Anticipate and manage negative issues in the work environment. | 15 | Implement secure backup and recover processes. |
6 | Know your assets. | 16 | Develop a formalized insider threat program. |
7 | Implement strict password and account management policies and practices. | 17 | Establish a normal network behavior baseline. |
8 | Enforce separation of duties and least privilege. | 18 | Be especially vigilant regarding social media. |
9 | Define explicit security agreements for any cloud services – address access restrictions and monitoring capabilities. | 19 | Close the doors to unauthorized data exfiltration. |
10 | Institute access controls and monitoring on privileged users. |
From the SEI/CMU Common Sense Guide for Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition.